
























































Firms worldwide must discuss and address the under-representation of 
women in senior positions. Growing regulatory pressure emerges. The 
European Commission’s proposal of a gender quota on the board of directors 
has been recently accepted through the European Parliament. The proposal 
is on its way through the legislative process. According to that proposal large 
firms must meet the demands for gender equality in the boardroom by 2020. 
The discussion in Europe will also trigger debates in non-European regions 
sooner or later. In this context it is essential to ascertain how gender quota 
regulations will affect company’s performances and the general economic 
evolution. Economic growth is driven by innovation, research and 
development of new technologies. We extend the existing research by 
investigating the relationship between corporate board composition in terms 
of gender diversity and its investments in research and development. 
Research and Development activities have the potential to stimulate 
economic development. Does gender-diversity in the boardroom matter for a 
firm's research and development investments? We have a large sample of 
companies across nations. This enables us to compare different geographic 
regions, which is also an extension of existing empirical work. We find mixed 
results for the influence of gender diversity on research and development 
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The board composition of a company is currently one of the most 
discussed issues in Corporate Governance. This is evident from both: 
the vast number of academic research in this field, as well as the 
political discussions (EU implementation). Gregory (2012) mentions 
“board composition and diversity” as one of the twelve key issues in 
Corporate Governance. The effect of board diversity on corporate 
success has been studied extensively in the past years. Gender 
diversity is likely to turn out as the most important category of board 
diversity when studying  board composition. Various quota systems 
appeared in legislation recently to promote gender diversity in board 
composition. First in Norway in 2005, and then in other European 
countries like France, Spain, Italy, Netherlands or Germany. Politicians, 
researchers, shareholders and businessmen are interested in the 
effects of such quotas. Do firms perform better if their board is (more) 
diverse? This question is addressed in numerous studies, with very 
ambitious results. 
The present thesis aims to examine the relationship between a firm’s 
gender diversity in the boardroom and its expenses in research and 
development (R&D). Innovation helps firms to survive, grow, become 
more efficient and ultimately more profitable than non-investing firms 
(Atalay et al., 2013). R&D activities contribute to the long-term growth of 
the firm. R&D activities explore new ways of conducting economic 
activity and develop new products and strategies. Those activities 
enhance the competitiveness and the ability to increase the profits, 
because they are likely leading to a decrease of production costs and 
an increase in the added value of the firm (Mansfield, 1996). 
The causal relationship between board composition and the impact on 
various corporate issues is drawn up from a number of different theories 
related to economic and sociological fields. Those theories, namely the 
agency theory, the human resource theory and the resource 
dependency theory are briefly introduced and set into the context in 




chapter 2.2. An important issue in this context, known as tokenism, will 
be explained in 2.3. A survey of the most important studies on board 
diversity affecting R&D and firm performance is the subject of chapter 
2.4. The Theoretical considerations and the cognition from the literature 
review are the basis for our hypotheses. The empirical investigation in 
chapter 3 is commonly structured and completed with the regression 
results. Finally conclusion is derived and recommendations for further 
research are given. 
2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Definition of Gender Diversity and R&D 
The understanding of what both gender diversity and R&D mean in the 
context of this thesis is crucial. Diversity is not commonly defined, but 
refers mostly to the heterogeneity of the individuals in one group. If a 
group is called diverse, it means that this group consists of many 
different people with different characteristics such as background, 
education, tenure, race or sex. Blau (1977, p.276) found a quantitative 
measure for diversity. According to him diversity is ”the great number of 
different statuses among which a population is distributed“. This 
indicator is called Blau index and measures the variation in categorial 
data.1 This index is very useful when determining diversity with various 
categories such as race, education, age etc. and is used by many 
researchers. This thesis solely investigates the diversity in one category 
- on gender diversity - and hence diversity is measured here by the 
absolute number of women on the board of directors (WOCB). We don’t 
use an index, because women are a minority in all companies in the 
sample set.  
R&D activities exist all over the world, but there are some 
characteristics that distinguish them from other scientific activities 
(Frascati manual, 2002). The Frascati manual defines R&D as „creative 
                                            
1 Blau Index = 1 - Σ (pi)2, where pi is the proportion of group members in each of the 
i number of categories 
	  




work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of 
knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the 
use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications.“ When R&D 
is conducted by a company, the monetary effects must be disclosed, if 
not immaterial.  
The International Accounting Standard (IAS) defines research as an 
“original and planned investigation undertaken with the prospect of 
gaining new scientific or technical knowledge and understanding” (IAS 
38). The standard also defines development as “the application of 
research findings or other knowledge to a plan or design for the 
production of new or substantially improved materials, devices, 
products, processes, systems or services before the start of commercial 
production or use’’ (IAS 38, §8). 
From these two definitions, R&D activities can be understood as all 
actions that a firm takes with the purpose to develop new or enhance 
existing business opportunities. The problem with this definition is that a 
firm sometimes might have also R&D activities that do not produce 
costs as defined above. One example is organizational innovation 
(Miller & Triana, 2009). In line with previous research, we will 
approximate R&D activities by the expenses in R&D published in the 
income statement (Pantagakis et al., 2012). 
Up to the present, there is a gap in the empirical work between the 
relationship of gender diversity and R&D activities. Therefore, we will 
also explore the relationship between R&D and firm performance as 
well as Gender diversity and firm performance.  
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
The influence of board diversity on various corporate issues is not 
derived from only single theory. On the contrary, various perspectives 
on the firm result in the application of several theories. The most 
relevant theories will be explained in the next section. As the review of 
existing empirical works will illustrate, there is not yet a consensus 
reached, about the impact of board diversity on the firm. 




2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Most of the advantages and benefits that board gender diversity yields 
for firm performance are tied to agency theory. Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) show that, through the separation of ownership and control a 
conflict of interest might lead to non-optimal management decisions. 
Directors that do not have a current or potential business relationship to 
the firm are more likely to make decisions solely in the interest of the 
shareholders (Becht et al., 2003). As reviewed by Ferreira (2010) a 
higher degree of independent directors leads to better monitoring. On 
the other hand, directors who have a current relationship to the firm 
(e.g. chief executives) are more likely to reveal firm-specific information 
to outside directors if they expect this information to improve the quality 
of advice provided by directors (Ferreira, 2010). In this way, the 
advisory function is can be improved. The connection to gender 
diversity is made by the argument that women are less likely to belong 
to the "old boys club" (Staubo, 2010). Hence, more gender diverse 
boards lead to better control mechanisms. Improved control 
mechanisms imply a better performance (Carter et al., 2010). Counter 
arguments assert that in some circumstances, board diversity might be 
also useless: The voice of a minority board member may not be heard 
by the majority (Westphal & Milton, 2000). So the "benefit" that women 
might bring to the board here is simply the possible independence. This 
is a very weak argument and actually discriminating men, since it 
assumes men being less independent than women. It is not a woman 
that improves something, it is the enhanced diversity a woman may 
bring to a homogeneous board. Hence if a board is already diverse or 
has good control mechanisms established, a benefit of additional 
diversity cannot be expected. The agency framework considers 
managers as risk averse (Fama, 1980). R&D spending is risky because 
of the uncertainty of future outcomes (Zona et al., 2013). Therefore, 
executives might invest less than optimally expected by shareholders 
who can diversify their risk among other companies (Zona et al., 2013). 




2.2.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
While the agency theory emphasizes the director's function of 
controlling, the resource dependence theory, developed by 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978), underlines the obligation of directors to 
acquire sufficient resources for the operations and to assure continuity 
of the organization. Critical resources are, for instance, all connections 
to key outsiders, advice and counsel. The choice of directors should 
maximize the access to critical resources (Dunn, 2012). Hillman et al. 
(2000) suggest that different types of directors will provide different 
beneficial resources to the firm. As a result, a more diverse board will 
provide more valuable resources, which should produce better firm 
performance and innovation. 
2.2.3 Human Capital Theory 
Individual's investments in education and experiences enlarge 
intellectual, creative and productive capabilities (Becker, 1964). Those 
capabilities are called personal human capital. Candidates seeking for 
boardroom appointments have generally acquired substantial human 
capital over a number of years (Terjesen et al., 2009). Following this 
theory, the argument, why women influence firm performance positively 
is quite evident: ignoring one group for management or boardroom 
position, means simply ignoring the resources that this group provides. 
Hence, a choice for one boardroom member cannot be optimal, when 
ignoring one pool of talents. This argument implicates the assumption 
that there is a substantial mass of women having, at least, equal human 
capital similar to men. This is a different research field and as such, not 
part of this thesis. Here, we take the view, that that a substantial mass 
of females with equivalent qualification as men exists, since the access 
to education is equal for both gender. 
2.3 Critical Mass and Tokenism 
Another issue that received little attention in the previous studies is the 
problem of tokenism. Tokenism is a situation when one individual (here 
it is a woman) is dominated by the others (here the men), and has no 




substantial influence to the decisions. The rationale for appointing 
tokens to the board can be to meet legislative requirements or signal 
good governance. In fact, most companies that have women on their 
board have just a single woman or just two of them (Torchia et al., 
2011). Are those women likely to have substantial influence to the 
corporation? Kramer et al. (2006) indicate that a critical mass is needed 
to allow a board to take advantage of gender diversity. Torchia et al. 
(2011) explored whether the number of women plays an important role 
and tried to find the "critical mass" that makes it possible to enhance the 
level of firm innovation. They employed a study with 317 Norwegian 
firms where women were the minority in the boardroom. The dependent 
variable is innovation. This variable had been measured by surveys 
sent to board members in the year 2005. They introduced three dummy 
variables: one woman, two women, more than two women and 
controlled for firm size and industry, as these factors are known to 
influence innovation. Their findings indicate, that a number of three 
women has to be reached, to enable women contributing significantly to 
firms innovation. Only one or two women on the board have no 
significant influence and hence are considered to be tokens. 
2.4 Review of Related Literature 
Board diversity has been associated with positive effects to creativity, 
innovation or new ideas (Galia & Zenou, 2012). Surprisingly, only few 
studies investigated this effect empirically (Alsos et al., 2013). 
Studies that investigate the effect of (gender) diversity on innovation 
such as Turner (2009) and Østergaard (2011) do not look at the board 
of director’s level. The studies on board diversity in the context of 
gender focus more on firm performance but not innovation or R&D 
activities, therefore, we will also explore the empirical work on the link 
between R&D and firm performance. However, some studies include 
R&D activities casually when looking at board gender diversity and firm 
performance. 




2.4.1 Gender Diversity and R&D 
The effect of gender diversity in decision making groups received mixed 
results in the literature. Diverse groups might enhance creativity and 
innovation because the individuals bring different perspectives, 
knowledge and experiences into the decision making process (Gul et 
al., 2011). On the other hand, diversity could hamper if the task is 
simple and/or structured as Kravitz (2003) notes. Board decisions are 
usually neither simple nor structured. Consequently, we do not expect a 
negative influence of board diversity to the board decisions. 
Galia and Zenou (2012) investigated the effect of board gender diversity 
on innovation with a sample of 176 french firms. Their sample had been 
collected from surveys and cover the period 2006 – 2008. They 
identified four types of innovation (product, process, organizational and 
marketing) and studied the effect of board gender diversity in each of 
the types. They found a negative relationship between WOCB and 
product innovation, but a positive for WOCB and marketing innovation 
and explain this gap by stating that „women on boards bring more 
impact in terms of understanding and targeting consumers' needs and 
markets, than on introduction itself of new products or new services“ 
(Galia & Zenou, 2012). 
Some US chief executives recognized, that a lack of diversity on a 
board can contribute to lack of critical thinking and innovation (Mattis, 
2000). Regarding the strategic decision of carrying out R&D activities 
we expect an influence of WOCB to R&D:  
In line with the Agency theory, the influence on R&D is expected to be 
negative, as the controlling function with its postoperative character 
may see R&D as a negative influence for current performance, or 
critically find that the R&D activities are not likely to lead to the desired 
output. If a more gender diverse board is assumed to increase control 
mechanisms (agency theory), WOCB may affect R&D in four ways2. A 
start or increase of R&D activities is viewed positively. From the 
                                            
2 start, stop, increase or decrease. 




resource dependence theory and the human resource theory, we can 
expect a positive influence on R&D. We test this statement through the 
hypotheses in chapter 2.6  
2.4.2 R&D and Firm Performance 
R&D activities ideally result in new business opportunities or cost 
reduction through innovation. Firm performance is usually measured by 
return variables, or market orientated measures, such as the ratio 
between market capitalization and book value of total assets. As R&D 
activities should improve future business opportunities, a causal 
relationship between R&D and firm performance appears plausible. 
Various studies explored the effects of R&D activities on firm 
performance and future returns. Ali et al. (2012) find that firms that 
increase research and development expenses, experience future 
abnormal returns. They explain this positive effect by a possible 
undervaluation in the market when R&D occurs and the correction 
appears when the benefits of R&D activities become visible. They argue 
that shareholders must focus more on this phenomenon of 
undervaluation. Cuervo-Cazurra and Annique Un (2010) link the firms 
decision to perform R&D or not to the real options theory (see Brach, 
2003; Damodaran, 2012; Fisher, 1930). Briefly, the option is exercised if 
the expected capital value surmounts the expected costs. Conditional to 
that, the option of investing in research and development must be 
available to the firm and therefore some innovative ideas or relation to 
other firms must be established. Chan et al. (2010) and Chambers et al. 
(2002) also find a positive associations between future stock returns 
and current R&D intensity. 
If such causal relationship between R&D and firm performance exists, 
as well as a causal relationship between Gender diversity and firm 
performance, a relationship between gender diversity and R&D 
expenses appears most likely. Because of their strategic character, 
R&D decisions are considered being directly linked to decisions made 
by the board of directors. Miller & Triana (2009) indicate such 
relationship by using innovation as a mediator between gender diversity 




and firm performance. 
2.4.3 Board Gender Diversity and Firm Performance 
There is no consensus reached about the impact of gender diversity on 
firm performance. 
Erhardt et al. (2003) investigate a sample of 112 large U.S. firms. They 
find a positive relationship between firm performance, measured in 
Return on Investment (ROI) and Return on Assets (ROA), and gender 
diversity in the board room. Similarly, Campbell & Mínguez-Vera (2008), 
for the case of 68 Spanish companies, find a positive relationship 
between a firm’s financial performance and board gender diversity. 
They use Tobin’s Q3 as a measure for the firm’s financial performance. 
They do not control for industry sector, although mentioning the findings 
of Brammer et al. (2007) who found that the concentration of women in 
a corporate board is depending (also) on the industry sector. There is a 
significant higher percentage of women in sectors that operate near the 
end consumer, such as retailing, banking, media and utilities. 
 
Shrader et al. (1997) inspect a sample of 200 large firms from the 
United States. They test the effect of the number of women at different 
levels: management, top management and board. The effect of 
percentage of women on board in 1992 on performance measures, 
taken one year later such as Return on Equity (ROE), ROI, ROA are 
either not significant or negativly significant in their sample.  
Adams & Ferreira (2009) have done the most robust analysis to board 
gender diversity because they were testing various models. Also, their 
sample and panel period is larger, consisting of 1939 listed US firms 
with data for the years 1996 - 2003. The relationship between females 
on the board and the firm’s performance, assessed by Tobin's Q and 
ROA is positive and significant using ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
taking industry dummies into account, but turns in to negative when 
considering firm fixed effects. For firms with a strong governance they 
                                            
3 ratio of the market value and the book value of a company. 




found a negative relation.  
 
Miller & Triana (2009) use a sample of 326 US firms and do not find any 
relationship between gender diversity in the boardroom and firm’s 
financial performance. They use innovation as a mediator.  
Another study that does not find a link is Carter et al. (2010). They use 
a panel data set of 641 firms and using time and firm level fixed effects 
as well as robust standard errors, they do not find a relationship 
between firm performance and board gender diversity. 
2.5 Causal Relationship between Board Diversity and Firm Innovation 
The board of directors is a crucial factor that supports all the innovation 
activities and influences the level of firm innovation (Zahra & Garvis, 
2000). The heterogeneity of the top management team promotes 
innovation in the firm  (Torchia et al., 2011; Carter et al., 2010). As 
Torchia et al. (2011) and Alsos et al. (2013) highlight, only a few studies 
investigated the effect of such patterns of board diversity, such as 
gender or age, on innovation. 
2.6 Development of Hypotheses 
The rationale for a causal relationship between board diversity and R&D 
activities is drawn up from different theories that have been explained in 
chapter 2.2. Regarding the strategic decision of carrying out R&D 
activities we can also expect an influence of WOCB on R&D. If we 
argue with the Agency theory, the influence on R&D is more expected 
to be negative, as the controlling function with its postoperative 
character may see R&D as a negative influence for current 
performance, or critically find that the R&D activities are not likely to 
lead to the desired output. If a more gender diverse board is assumed 
to increase control mechanisms (agency theory), WOCB may affect 
R&D in three ways4. From the resource dependence theory and the 
                                            
 




human resource theory, we can expect a positive influence on R&D. We 
test these statements with the following hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of WOCB has a positive effect on R&D 
investments. 
The studies, that were introduced in chapter 2.4.3 indicate, that the 
effect of Board gender diversity might be different across nations. In 
Europe quota systems are on the legislative process. Therefore, we 
want to test this proposition with 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of WOCB on R&D investments differs by the 
geographic origin of the company. 
The assessment of the geographic origin is explained later. 
The phenomena of tokenism had been assessed in chapter 2.3. To 
evidence the existence of a “critical mass” we formulate 
Hypothesis 3: The number of women in the boardroom has no effect 
on R&D investments if there are less than 3 women in 
the board room. 
The hypotheses are tested and validated in the next chapter. The next 
chapter provides an empirical analysis in order to answer the following 
question: Is there an influence of WOCB to R&D ?. This is the research 
question. 
3 EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION 
3.1 Data Collection and Sample Description 
Data was collected from the Bloomberg database, the largest database 
available to us. It collects all financial information a company legally 
must disclose. Additionally, it collects company data in various fields, 
such as governance or management histories. Unfortunately this 
database suffers from some shortcomings on complete datasets 
resulting in missing values. However, we were able to gather a large, 
representative sample. To consider results being representative, the 
sample must be large enough and drawn randomly from the underlying 
population (Auer & Rottmann, 2012). 




Our sample contains companies being active from 2008 until 2012 and 
having available data on its board size. As the board size is modest to 
determine, missing values are assumed to be missing completely at 
random and therefore this sample is a reverse random sample (Auer & 
Rottmann, 2012). 
After cleaning the sample from missing data, we have balanced panel 
data available for 2,220 companies, resulting in 11,100 firm years. 
3.1.1 Dependent Variable 
The R&D activities are a proxy for a firm’s (future) innovation and they 
are essential for the long-term success of a corporation (Flamm, 1990). 
We consider unstandardized R&D expenses as a good proxy for a 
firm’s investment in its own future although there are also nonmonetary 
types of innovation, such as organizational, process or marketing 
innovation.  
 
In order to compare different countries worldwide, the amounts are 
collected in million USD from the database. One feature of the 
Bloomberg database is that it automatically converts monetary data with 
the historical exchange rates, producing comparable data. 
3.1.2 Independent Variables  
a) Number of WOCB 
We use the number of WOCB instead of proportion as an explanatory 
variable, because we want to compare the results on the different 
hypotheses, and the critical mass hypothesis explicitly demands for the 
number of WOCB. We introduce one lag to allow decisions of the board 
become visible. 
b) Board Size 
Following Erhardt et al. (2003) we use board size as a control variable 
and introduce also one time lag to allow board decisions becoming 
visible. 




c) Firm Size 
The firm size has an influence on R&D investment. Larger firms have 
the necessary financial and technical capabilities. They can spread the 
risk of failure through economies of scope and benefit from some more 
size-depending features (Damanpour, 2010, p.998). 
Firm size is approximated by the natural logarithm of total assets 
(Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). 
d) Firm Age 
Firm age is defined as the year of incorporation, not the years in 
business. This is important to remember at the interpretation. For 44 
firms, the year of incorporation is later than 2008. Since these firms 
report data on all years, and often have an older date of initial public 
offer (IPO), these are firms that either merged or changed their legal 
form. 
e) Industry Sector 
As Figure 1 in the Appendix shows, R&D expenditures vary across 
industry sectors. We follow the procedure of Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
to control for industry effects that is, introducing dummy variables for 
each industry. We use the Global Classification Standard (GIC) as an 
identifyer. 
f) Continent 
To account for regional differences, we also use the continent where a 
company is installed. This is derived from the reported country of 
domicile. It is not necessary the country where a company operates, but 
usually this should be the same country where the board sits in. 
g) Control Variables 
The accounting figure “Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation 
and Amortization” (EBITDA) and performance measure Tobin's Q are 
used as a control variables. There might be an effect since the 
expenses on R&D activities might be seen as a cost by the market and 
hence leading to a decrease in market value of the firm. Also, R&D 




expenses can be only activated under restrictive conditions5 and hence 
it is difficult to increase the book value by the valuable R&D activities. 
Other performance and return variables are not expected to influence 
current or future R&D expenses. It is more the other way around, that 
R&D expenses or activities should affect those variables in the future. 
This is the main purpose of R&D activities. On the other hand, it might 
be plausible that more profitable firms may raise more sufficient funds 
for research and development. This relation, even though interesting, is 
out of the scope of this thesis. Accordingly, the model is restricted to the 
mentioned variables. 
An overview of all used variables with their characteristics can be found 
in Table IX in the Appendix. 
3.1.3 Discussion of Missing Data 
Ignoring or discarding companies with missing data could bias the 
sample and make results useless (Baltagi, 2008). 
Frees (2004, p.266) discusses three methods how to deal with partially 
missing data: 
i) Use unbalanced estimation techniques. 
ii) Utilize only subjects with complete set of observations, 
discard incomplete subjects. 
iii) Impute values for missing observations. 
Since the sample only includes five years and we use lagged 
independent variables, the first method seem not to be appropriate. The 
third method is also not recommendable in this case, because we have 
only five years of observations per subject, and the estimation error 
would be too high. The second option fits best to the nature of data, but 
depends heavily on the MCAR assumption. Missing data on R&D were 
substituted by zero if and only if the previous and the following values 
were also zero, or if all subsequent or previous values equalled zero. 
This can be justified by the long term nature of R&D activities. Other 
missing values are assumed to miss completely at random because we 
                                            
5 See for example IAS 18 




suppose that there was an error in disclosure or data collection of 
Bloomberg. Therefore, those companies were discarded from the 
sample. 
The sample contained only three companies with missing data on 
number and percentage of WOCB. This number is too small to bias the 
results.  
Thus we have a balanced panel of 2,220 firms with 5 year observations, 
consequently 11,100 firm years. 
3.1.4 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
Table I shows the female representation of WOCB in the world. 59% of 
all companies in the sample had (on average) no woman in the board of 
directors. This table  
TABLE I.FEMALE REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE BOARDS (WORLDWIDE) 
2220 companies 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average Proportion 
no woman  1381 1349 1322 1268 1232 1310.4 59.03 % 
one woman  497 507 520 526 494 508.8 22.92 % 
two women  232 246 261 284 319 268.4 12.09 % 
more than two women  110 118 117 142 175 132.4   5.96 % 
 
The next tables show a summary of variables and the correlation 
matrix. 




TABLE II. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Variable name6 Mean S.D. Min Max 
1 RD 219.772 832.068 0 11,381.284 
2 No. WOCB 0.672 0.981 0 7 
3 % WOCB 6.751 9.604 0 62.5 
4 Board Size 9.541 3.258 2 33 
5 EBITDA 1,323.089 4,363.480 0.025 78,669 
6 Total Assets 291,631.588 1,234,551.409 1.044 5.25E+07 
7 Tobin's Q 0.552 12.001 0 1,247.233 
8 Year of Incorporation 1966.281 31.805 1836 2014 
 
The descriptive statistics show that there is a large variation in the 
monetary variables (1, 5, 6). The standard deviation is much higher 
than the mean. This means, that many firms have zero R&D while 
others have very high R&D. However, the R&D expenses are 
lognormally distributed (see Figure 1 in the Appendix). This is also true 
for the total assets and Tobin’s Q. We can conclude here, that the firms 
in the sample are very heterogeneous, which is not surprising as we 
have a sample across industries and continents. To account for this 
problem, we take the natural logarithm of each monetary variable. 
TABLE III. CORRELATION TABLE 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 R&D 1        
2 No. WOCB 0.19*** 1       
3 % WOCB 0.13*** 0.95*** 1      
4 Board Size 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.09*** 1     
5 EBITDA 0.47*** 0.26*** 0.18*** 0.25*** 1    
6 Total Assets  0.4*** 0.19*** 0.11***  0.27* 0.52*** 1   
7 Tobin's Q  0 -0.01 0 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 1  
8 Year of Incorporation -0.04*** 0.14*** 0.18*** -0.16***  0.02 -0.01 0.03*** 1 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
                                            
6  Variables 1, 5 and 6 were measured in million USD. 




All correlations among the independent variables are low, except of 
course for the number and percentage of WOCB. These two variables 
are not included at the same time in the regressions. If one of the 
independent variables is highly correlated with another independent 
variable the problem of multicollinearity occurs (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Multicollinearity in a regression means, that two or more variables 
influence the dependent variable in the same way, so we can’t 
distinguish the individual effect of each variable on the dependant 
variable and we obtain biased coefficient estimations. In addition to that, 
the ceteris paribus assumption may not be applicable for very high 
correlated variables. The problem of multicollinearity is not apparent 
(evident) in this case. 
3.2 Model Specifications 
To answer the research question formulated in the beginning of this 
chapter, multiple linear regression models are applied. A Multiple linear 
regression is a regression model where the dependent variable is 
continuous, explained by several exogenous variables, and linear in the 
parameters (Baltagi, 2008). 
Following the previous literature in this field, the coefficients of the 
model are estimated through the method of ordinary least square (OLS) 
regressions and then the advanced panel data methods fixed and 
random effects estimation are applied (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Erhardt 
et al., 2003; Miller & Triana, 2009). 
 
In this case, where cross-sectional time series data is available, the 
model for the regression can be specified as follows: 
Yit = β0 + β1Xit1+ β2Xit2+…+ βkXitk+ ai + uit ( 1 ) 
 
Where  
Yt ln of RD investments in t 
X1t-1 Number of WOCB in t-1 
X2t-1 Board Size in t-1 




X3t-1 Ln of Total Assets in t-1 
X4t-1 Ln of EBITDA in t-1 




The R&D expenditures are log transformed in order to account for their 
distribution (see the normal quantile plot, Figure 2 in the Appendix). For 
reasons of simplicity, all other monetary values are also log 
transformed. The random and fixed effects estimation methods are able 
to address unobservable heterogeneity. Unobservable heterogeneity is 
a situation where some special characteristics of a firm that are not 
observed have an influence on the dependent variable. This influence 
might be for example a firm’s overall government policy or the chance 
of receiving subsidies for R&D. The first is likely to have also an 
influence on WOCB. The latter might not influence WOCB. Subsidies 
affect the return on invested capital but as they are paid upfront the 
independent lagged variable EBITDA is not expected to be influenced 
by the firm specific effect. 
Assuming that the unobserved effect !! is uncorrelated with all 
independent variables, equation (1) becomes a random effect model 
(Wooldridge, 2010, p.492), with 
Cov (xitk, ai) = 0 ( 2 ) 
In order to test whether the unobserved effect ai is correlated a 
Hausman test is conducted (Hausman, 1978). 
3.3 Empirical Results 
First of all, we estimate the econometric model by the classical method 
OLS. Also, we used the GLS estimation to fit the FE, RE models. Such 
estimations aim to test the hypotheses formulated. Table IV 
summarizes the results. The GLS regressions are more suitable in this 
case because they correct estimated coefficients for the omitted 
variable bias and presence of autocorrelation relationship and 
heteroskedasticity in pooled time series data (Hoechle, 2007). 




Alternatively to the Breusch-Pagan test we used the White test, which 
does not assume a specific form of heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 
2010). The White test rejected the null hypothesis of constant variance 
(p-value=0.0000) which means, that we have heteroskedasticity and 
therefore, the OLS regressions do not provide the best linear unbiased 
estimators. 
TABLE IV. RESULTS OF REGRESSIONS: R&D ON WOCB  
Dependent Variables Independent Variable: ln (R&D) 
 
(OLS) (AREG) (FE) (RE) 
Number of WOCBt-1 -0.0323  0.0529*  0.0529*  0.0630* 
 
(0.0244) (0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0138) 
Board Sizet-1  0.0234*  0.0052  0.0052  0.0236* 
 
(0.0064) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0055) 
ln (Total Assets t-1)  0.1417*   0.0844*  0.0844*  0.177* 
 
(0.0119) (0.0108) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
ln (EBITDA t-1)  0.6416*  0.0925*  0.0925*  0.1936* 
 
(0.0158) (0.0106) (0.0112) (0.0137) 
Year of Incorporation -0.0064* omitted omitted -0.0094* 
 
(0.0006) (.) (.) (0.00145 
Tobin's Q  0.0022* -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Continent Effects7 Yes No No Yes 
Sector effects Yes No No Yes 
Constant  8.7895*  2.2328*  2.2328* 16.9266* 
  (1.2577) (0.1268) (0.1371)  (2.9506) 
Observations 6306 6306 6306 6306 
R-squared 0.5899 0.9783 0.0364 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.5886 0.9708 0.0356   
(Robust)8 Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
                                            
7  Continent and Sector were included with dummy variables. For AREG and FE 
results, we did not include them because they don’t change over time. 
8  For all regressions except OLS we used robust standard errors. 




The first estimation in Table IV is a simple OLS and shows no 
significant relationship between WOCB and R&D. But the results are 
biased due to the fact that (other) firm specific effects are not taken into 
account. Both, the fixed effects and the random effects model show the 
same prefix and significance levels on the coefficients. But the 
coefficients from the random effects estimation are slightly higher than 
from the fixed-effects regression. The fixed effects model uses the 
variation within one panel, therefore, values, that keep constant over 
the time period are omitted. This is the case for the year of 
incorporation, continent and sector of one company. In the sample, 
those values did not change over time. The AREG and FE results do 
not differ in the coefficients, but in the level of errors and the reported R 
squared. R-square reports how much of the variability of the dependent 
variable can be explained by the independent variables (Wooldridge, 
2010). The R-squared of the FE estimation has not much explanatory 
power because this type of regression uses the within variation 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). Therefore, we also show the AREG results. 
The random-effect model estimation assumes that the unobserved 
heterogeneity is not correlated with the independent variables. We 
conduct a Hausman test to validate which model is more suitable. The 
Hausman test for the basic model shows that the differences are 
systematic in the two regressions (Prob> Chi2 = 0.000). This means, 
that the assumption for the random-effect estimation is not valid, hence 
it is better to use the FE estimation methods. Accordingly, the further 
analysis is based on the fixed effects results. Continent and Industry 
effects are omitted because they do not vary over time. They are part of 
the firms fixed effects characteristics. 
Table IV, column 3 and 4 show that there is positive relationship at the 
5% significance level between the lagged number of females and the 
expenses on R&D. If one more woman is added to the board of 
directors, ceteris paribus the R&D expenses increases on average by 
5.29% in the next year. Hence we can reject the alternative hypothesis 
that β1 ≤ 0 at 0.05 level of significance. This means Hypothesis 1 is 




supported by our model. The other independent variables do also have 
significant influence on R&D. Larger and older firms are investing more 
in research and development. This is consistent with previous findings, 
e.g. Hillman et al. (2007). Larger firms may have sufficient funds for 
R&D. For Firm age, the year of incorporation (e. g. "founded in 1979") 
was used, in order to avoid increasing values by 1 each year. Hence, 
the negative coefficient means that younger firms invest, on average, 
less in R&D. Or, the other way around, older firms invest more. Older 
firms are likely to have experienced staff and knowledge to perform 
R&D activities. 
Next, we want to see, whether the relationship between WOCB and 
R&D is different across continents. We still assume that the firm fixed 
effects remain the same as in the previous analysis and repeat the 
regression for each Continent. 
TABLE V. RESULTS OF REGRESSIONS: R&D ON WOCB ACROSS CONTINENTS 
Dependent 
variables Independent Variable: ln (R&D) 
 Africa Asia Australia Europe North America 
South 
America 
No. of WOCBt-1  0.0238  0.1877**  0.0299  0.0116  0.0343  -0.1869 
 (0.2134) (0.0642) (0.0835) (0.0188) (0.0187)  (0.1506) 
Board Sizet-1  0.1981 -0.0013 -0.0135  0.0127  0.0299*   0.1088 
 (0.1158) (0.0064) (0.0518) (0.0170) (0.0138)  (0.1694) 
ln(Total Assetst-1) -0.2157  0.1195*** -0.0423  0.0729*  0.0616***   0.3905 
 (0.2501) (0.0270) (0.0706) (0.0302) (0.0134)  (0.2440) 
ln(EBITDAt-1) -0.0136  0.0993***  0.3019*  0.120***  0.0721***  -0.007 
 (0.1601) (0.0139) (0.1233) (0.0328) (0.0200)  (0.1585) 
Tobin’s Q  1.2930 -0.0454** -0.0157  0.0044 -0.0001*** -24.0635 
 (1.6396) (0.0154) (0.0499) (0.0180) (0.0000) (12.2747) 
Constant  1.2050   1.4517***  1.291  2.7292***  3.0042***   -0.3587 
 (2.7637) (0.2802) (0.9527) (0.4034) (0.1977)   (3.1747) 
Observations  44 3329 107 952 1854 20 
R2  0.1423  0.0464  0.1183  0.0339  0.0440   0.3197 
Adjusted R2  0.0295  0.0449  0.0746  0.0288  0.0418   0.0767 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
 
Now, we see only in Asia there is a significant positive relationship of 
WOCB towards R&D. For the other continents, except South America 
the relationship is positive, but not significant anymore. While we have 




assumed the fixed effects remain the same, the results indicate, that the 
fixed effects vary across continents. For Asia, the coefficient is more 
than three times higher than in the previous regression. A look to the 
female representation on corporate boards in Asia can shed some light 
to this puzzle (see also Table I): 
TABLE VI. FEMALE REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE BOARDS (ASIA) 
1125 companies 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average Proportion 
No woman  979 966 954 954 949 960.4 85% 
One woman  107 120 124 119 126 119.2 11% 
Two women  28 28 35 40 33 32.8 2% 
More than two women  11 11 12 12 17 12.6 1% 
 
About half of the companies in the sample are from Asia. And here the 
representation of WOCB is much lower than in the other regions. On 
average during the years 2008 to 2012 there were only 0.2 WOCB on 
the board of directors of Asian companies where the average board 
size was 9.75. On average 85% of the Asian companies had no women 
on their board, the average worldwide was 59% in this sample. 
Compared to the Catalyst Report (2013) these figures are lower. The 
Catalyst reports only on US Fortune 500 Companies. Those are the 
largest or most powerful companies, which might be a good indicator, 
but cannot really being seen as representative for the economy. The 
worldwide sample that is used here takes also smaller companies 
(smaller than US Fortune 500, but still large) in account. This promises 
being more representative and giving more realistic picture. 
According to the regression results in Table V if one more woman is 
added to the board of an Asian company and holding everything else 
constant, the R&D expenses on average would increase by 18% in the 
next year. But as the previous tables showed, the Number of WOCB in 
Asia is with 0.2 on average close to zero. Therefore we cannot 
conclude, that WOCB have such an effect on R&D expenses. Clearly, 
the results show that the effect of WOCB differs by continent 




(Hypothesis 2), but do not support Hypothesis 1. 
In section 2.3, we pointed out the theory of a critical mass. Some 
authors argue, that women do only have significant influence [..on 
performance..] if they are not simply used as a token. Three or more 
women are considered to be a number above tokenism (Kramer et al., 
2006). Now, the fixed effects regression will be repeated on two 
different groups: the first has more than two WOCB; the second has 
less than three WOCB. As one company might change from one to the 
other group, we have an unbalanced panel now, but the procedure is 
the same: 
TABLE VII. RESULTS OF REGRESSION: R&D ON WOCB GROUPED BY NO OF 
WOCB 
Dependent Variables Independent Variable: ln (R&D) 
 
WOCB > 2 WOCB ≤ 2 
Number of WOCBt-1 0.0021 0.0655*** 
 
(0.0188) (0.0197) 
Board Sizet-1 0.0376* 0.0043 
 
(0.0154) (0.0059) 
ln (Total Assets t-1) 0.0471 0.0851*** 
 
(0.0361) (0.0123) 
ln (EBITDA t-1) 0.0353 0.0948*** 
 
(0.0941) (0.0112) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0219 -0.0002*** 
 (0.0425) (0.0000) 
Constant 3.9909*** 2.1463*** 
 
(0.8719) (0.1400) 
Observations 371 5935 
R-squared 0.0385 0.0369 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0253 0.0361 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
 
For the group of less than three women on corporate boards, the 
figures indicate a significant influence on R&D. If in this group, on 
average one woman is added to the board, the R&D expenses increase 
on average by 6.55%. Hypothesis 3 stated that there is no effect of 




WOCB on R&D investments in this group. Hence Hypothesis 3 is not 
supported. This contradicts the findings of Miller & Triana (2009). A 
possible explanation is, that a board with three or more WOCB might be 
(gender) diverse enough and is not benefitting anymore from an 
additional woman. Indeed the argument that "too much diversity" is 
disadvantageous and it leads to a long decision processes, such 
explanation is discussed in the study of Adams & Ferreira (2009). In the 
case of R&D which is related to innovation, more diverse decision 
groups might lead to original ideas. In fact, an inverse u-shaped 
relationship appears plausible for diversity. Such a relationship would 
go beyond the possibilities of linear panel regressions and the 
framework of this thesis and is therefore not investigated further. 
4 CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, we first depicted the theories that are usually 
referred when establishing a causal relationship between board gender 
diversity and firm performance. Then, we reviewed briefly the relevant 
literature in the field of board (gender) diversity and set it into the 
context to R&D activities. Subsequently, we formulated the hypotheses 
that WOCB positively influence R&D investments (H1), that the effect is 
different across regions worldwide (H2) and finally tested if a critical 
mass of WOCB for R&D investments exists (H3) and specified the 
model. We tested a sample of 2,220 worldwide firms for the period 2008 
until 2012. Hypothesis 1 received mixed support. In the first regression 
analysis it was supported, but when investigating different regions 
worldwide, we had to revise this proposition since the effect was only 
driven from Asian firms, where only few WOCB exist. Women have 
different perspectives, experiences, ideas etc. than their male 
counterparts and if not appointed as tokens they will be heard. Thus, 
the enhanced gender diversity in the boardroom was expected to 
positively influence R&D activities. R&D activities include also non-
monetary measures. On the monetary measures that were used here, 
the existence of a "Critical Mass" of WOCB that some scholars found 




on firm performance could not be confirmed. The results here indicate, 
that a board with more than two women is diverse enough and R&D 
investments do not increase significantly after a third woman (or more) 
is added to the board. But the same might not be true for the non-
monetary measures of innovation. 
Board diversity remains an interesting field of research. We could not 
confirm any relation from the investigated sample, neither positive, nor 
negative of Board Gender Diversity towards R&D investments. We saw, 
that there are large differences around the world on the number of 
WOCB. But in all regions, WOCB remain a minority. From the firm 
perspective, an economic rational to improve (gender) diversity could 
not be found. Hence firms do not have an incentive to improve (gender) 
diversity. However, for reasons of fairness and equality improving, 
gender diversity must continue to be a focus of local and international 
governance. As such, structures must be established that enable 
(more) women to take key roles in economic sectors and political 
decisions to accelerate this process. 
5 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A broader analysis of board diversity and innovation is recommendable. 
More factors to measure diversity, such as age range, tenure, director's 
independency could be included to extend the econometric model used 
here and consequently point more determinants of innovation. These 
measures are hardly to determine for large samples, especially with 
worldwide companies. The data is not available for many countries, and 
if available possibly not comparable, since the definition of dependency 
might vary across countries. Even though, such data fields were 
available in Bloomberg, we had to assert that the quality and quantity of 
the data entries in those field simply did not comply with academic 
demand on integrity and accuracy. Those measures directly refer to 
personal biographies which are only occasionally complete in the 
database, in fact just for very well known people, but never for the 
whole board. We recommend including such measures in future 




analysis. Also the determination of innovation can be improved, for 
instance with non-monetary measures. Such data must be possibly 
gathered through surveys as Torchia et al. (2011) did. 
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V.  APPENDIX 
Figure 1 – R&D Expenses Over the Years 2008 – 2012 by Industry Sector 
 








TABLE VIII. AVERAGE BOARD SIZE 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
Africa 11.71 11.43 11.79 12.21 12.00 11.83 
Asia 10.06 9.80 9.74 9.64 9.52 9.75 
Australia 6.66 6.68 6.65 6.71 6.85 6.71 
Europe 9.94 9.86 9.89 10.00 10.07 9.95 
North America 9.41 9.47 9.44 9.44 9.50 9.45 
South 
America 8.20 9.40 9.60 9.60 9.80 9.32 




                                            
9 The plots for ln(Total Assets) and ln(EBITDA) lookalike. Therefore they are not shown 
here again. 
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